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Depending on how you count, we are now in the fourth or 
fifth year of the new millennium.  Ordinarily, one would think that 
it is too early to make lofty pronouncements about Supreme Court 
jurisprudence in this millennium, or even this century.  And 
perhaps it is.  However, at least in trademark law, the dawning of 
the new millennium has seen a significant quickening of the pace 
and importance of trademark cases in the Supreme Court.  If we 
measure the new millennium from the year 2000 (the first year 
beginning with a “2”), a year marking an important shift in 
trademark law, there have been four Supreme Court trademark 
cases already decided, with a fifth one in the pipeline.  Considering 
that in the last fifty years of the twentieth century trademark law 
had been somewhat of a backwater in the Supreme Court’s docket, 
 
†     Professor of Law, Whittier Law School.  A.B. Princeton University, 1975; 
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this development represents a markedly increased interest in this 
area of law.  Moreover, as will be seen, these cases appear to signify 
a shift in attitude by the Court about trademark law, or at least 
about the general direction of trademark law. 
The Supreme Court’s four trademark opinions this 
millennium have three critical factors in common: (i) all four 
decisions were unanimous;1 (ii) all four decisions reversed the 
decision of a court of appeals; and (iii) all four decisions took a 
narrow view of the protective umbrella afforded by the trademark 
laws.  The clarity of these results is striking—obviously, the Court is 
sending a message.  One part of the message is clear: the Court is 
unhappy with the expansive view of trademark protection put forth 
by many lower courts.  This unhappiness appears to stem from the 
Court’s conviction that trademark law remains an offshoot of unfair 
competition rather than a subset of intellectual property law.  But a 
further explication of the Court’s new millennium message 
requires that we explore its jurisprudence in the previous 
millennium. 
We will begin with that discussion, and then move on to a 
discussion of the “new millennium” cases. 
I. TRADEMARK LAW IN THE OLD MILLENNIUM 
A.  The Earliest Years 
Although trademarks have been traced back several hundred 
years, fortunately for us the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this 
area does not stretch quite that far.  We begin in the nineteenth 
century, with the celebrated opinion in In re Trade-Mark Cases.2  In 
that case, the Court held the Trademark Act of 1870 (as amended 
in 1876) to be beyond the constitutional bounds of Congress’s 
 
 1. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in one case, but he also 
joined the opinion of the Court.  Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 
435 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia declined to join the portion 
of the Moseley opinion discussing legislative history.  See id. at 420 n.*.  Justice 
Breyer did not participate in the last case, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003). 
 2. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).  The decision in In re Trade-Mark Cases was not the 
Court’s first trademark opinion.  For example, just seven years earlier, the Court 
decided Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311 (1872), where the Court denied relief to 
the first seller of “Lackawanna” coal against a competitor using the same 
geographic name, which accurately described its origin. 
2
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power.3  One may be tempted to dismiss the Trade-Mark Cases as 
representing the Court’s narrow late-nineteenth-century view of 
Congress’s commerce power, rather than a view about trademark 
law.4  But I believe that would ignore some interesting aspects of 
the opinion.  The 1870 trademark statute was part of a statute 
entitled “An Act to revise, consolidate, and amend the statutes 
relating to patents and copyrights.”5  Evidently, Congress assumed it 
had the power to regulate trademarks as a “necessary and proper” 
adjunct to its power to regulate the traditional areas of intellectual 
property, namely patents and copyrights.6  But the Court did not 
agree.  In its view, a trademark did not look like a patent: 
The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to 
invention or discovery.  The trade-mark recognized by the 
common law is generally the growth of a considerable 
period of use rather than a sudden invention . . . and 
when under the act of Congress it is sought to establish it 
by registration, neither originality, invention, discovery, 
science, nor art is in any way essential to the right 
conferred . . . .7 
Nor did a trademark look like a copyright: 
[W]hile the word writings may be liberally construed . . . it 
is only such as are original, and are founded in the creative 
powers of the mind.  The writings which are to be 
protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the 
form of books, prints, engravings, and the like. The trade-
mark may be, and generally is, the adoption of something 
already in existence as the distinctive symbol of the party 
using it. At common law the exclusive right to it grows out 
of its use, and not its mere adoption. By the act of 
Congress this exclusive right attaches upon registration. 
But in neither case does it depend upon novelty, 
invention, discovery, or any work of the brain. It requires 
no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought. 
It is simply founded on priority of appropriation. We look 
in vain in the statute for any other qualification or 
 
 3. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 99. 
 4. See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868) (“Issuing a policy of 
insurance is not a transaction of commerce.”). 
 5. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 92. 
 6. Id.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (the Patents and Copyrights Clause).  
The statute at issue provided that trademarks would be registered with the Patent 
Office.  In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 92. 
 7. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94. 
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condition. If the symbol, however plain, simple, old, or 
well-known, has been first appropriated by the claimant as 
his distinctive trade-mark, he may by registration secure 
the right to its exclusive use.8 
Only after exhausting these possibilities did the Court 
examine, but reject, the possibility that the statute might be 
sustained under Congress’s commerce power.9  Thus, trademarks 
were left as a kind of outlier in the world of intellectual property, 
protected by common law, but not the same species of property as 
patents and copyrights.  Less than a decade later, in a very short 
opinion in another case, the Court reiterated its belief that the 
grounding of trademark law is in deception, not in a strong 
proprietary interest.10 
The end of the nineteenth century (1896 to be precise) 
brought another landmark, the Singer case,11  which further 
solidified the Court’s skepticism about expansive notions of 
trademark law.  Singer was the most prominent manufacturer of 
sewing machines of its era.  However, when the patents on various 
elements of Singer’s machines expired in the 1870s, competition 
appeared.12  The defendant, a competitor of Singer’s, 
manufactured its machines to look like those of Singer (even 
placing a “dummy” screw on the machine where the Singer-made 
machines had a still-patented tension screw device).13  In addition, 
the defendant marked and advertised its machines as “Improved 
Singer” machines.14  The principal issue, therefore, was whether the 
shape of the machines and the name “Singer” were generic 
designations.15 
Viewed from a modern perspective, one can criticize the 
manner in which the Court reached its conclusion in Singer that the 
form and the name were both generic.  But that is not the point of 
this discussion, which is to understand the underlying 
jurisprudence, or mindset, of the Court at the time.  Thus, we leave 
 
 8. Id. at 94. 
 9. Id. at 97-98. 
 10. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Finzer, 128 U.S. 182, 184 (1888) (denying 
relief citing, inter alia, differences in the “star” designs used by each party, as well 
as lack of evidence of confusion). 
 11. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896). 
 12. See id. at 174-77. 
 13. Id. at 177. 
 14. Id. at 176-77.  The defendant’s trade name also appeared on the 
machines.  Id. 
 15. Id. at 178. 
4
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to others the extended critique of Singer’s reasoning, and only seek 
to discern its message. 
Considering first the claim as to the form or appearance of the 
machines—an issue that would reappear in the Court’s first two 
“new millennium” cases—the Court dismissed Singer’s contentions 
with very simple (perhaps even simplistic) reasoning.  The 
machines were covered by patents, and the expiration of the 
patents essentially precluded the claim: 
It is self evident that on the expiration of a patent the 
monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to 
make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes 
public property . . . . It follows, as a matter of course, that 
on the termination of the patent there passes to the 
public the right to make the machine in the form in which it 
was constructed during the patent.  We may therefore dismiss 
without further comment the complaint as to the form in 
which the defendant made his machines.16 
Notice that the italicized portion does not refer to the form in 
which the patent required the machine to be made, but simply the 
form used by the company that owned the patent.17 
As to the “Singer” name, the Court held that the expiration of 
the patent necessarily gave the public the right to use 
the generic designation of the thing which has arisen 
during the monopoly in consequence of the designation 
having been acquiesced in by the owner, either tacitly, by 
accepting the benefits of the monopoly, or expressly by 
his having so connected the name with the machine as to 
lend countenance to the resulting dedication.  To say 
otherwise would be to hold that, although the public had 
acquired the device covered by the patent, yet the owner 
of the patent or the manufacturer of the patented thing 
had retained the designated name which was essentially 
necessary to vest the public with the full enjoyment of that 
which had become theirs by the disappearance of the 
monopoly.  In other words, that the patentee or 
manufacturer could take the benefit and advantage of the 
patent upon the condition that at its termination the 
monopoly should cease, and yet when the end was 
 
 16. Id. at 185 (emphasis added). 
 17. The above statement is tempered by the Court’s earlier statement 
indicating that the patents gave the Singer machines “as a whole, a distinctive 
character and form.”  Id. at 179. 
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reached, disregard the public dedication and practically 
perpetuate indefinitely an exclusive right.18 
What is notable about this analysis is the Court’s expressed fear 
that the patent owner might use trademark or unfair competition 
law to extend indefinitely the practical life of the patent.  Thus, at 
least where another form of intellectual property was directly 
implicated, the Court appeared unwilling to permit trademark law 
to become a functional substitute for that other form of protection. 
Of course, as the Court’s ultimate decree recognized, the right 
to compete by using the form of the machines and the generic 
designation “Singer” was not unlimited.  Finding that the 
defendant had not marked its machines with a sufficiently 
prominent disclosure of the actual source of manufacture, and that 
some of defendant’s advertisements did not adequately disclose the 
true source of the goods, the Court ordered an accounting of 
defendant’s wrongfully obtained profits.19  But the finding was 
based on a desire to protect the public from deception, and did not 
alter the foundation of the Court’s opinion that the form of the 
machines and the “Singer” name were dedicated to the public.20 
B.  The Twentieth Century: Pre-Lanham Act 
In the first half of the twentieth century, the Court actually 
decided a relatively large number of trademark cases.  Many were 
not of lasting consequence, but a few set standards that remain to 
this day. 
Reviewing these cases, we see that the limited view of 
trademark protection expressed in Singer and the Trade-Mark Cases 
continued into the first half of the twentieth century.  As early as 
1901, the Court refused to allow protection to the Elgin Watch 
Company, which was based in Elgin, Illinois, against the use of the 
“Elgin” name on watch cases made by other manufacturers also 
located in Elgin.21  The Court found that the Elgin name primarily 
signified a place of manufacture, and therefore could not operate 
 
 18. Id. at 185-86. 
 19. Id. at 200-04. 
 20. This distinction would resurface in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 
U.S. 111 (1938), Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Compco 
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
 21. Elgin Nat’l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 677 
(1901). 
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as a trademark.22  Two better-known opinions of this era are the 
Hanover Star Milling and Rectanus duo23 from 1916 and 1918, 
respectively, in which the Court limited the protection of the first 
user of a trademark to the geographic area in which its trademark 
was used or known, thus providing a safe haven for the so-called 
good-faith remote junior user who had built up a trade in a 
particular location without knowledge of the prior user.24  Again, 
the focus of these cases was on unfair competition and deception, 
not on an absolute property right (which would have favored 
granting the senior user absolute priority over any junior users).  
These two decisions were followed by a number of less critical 
decisions, leading up to the next “big” case, Kellogg Co. v. National 
Biscuit Co.25  These intermediate cases, while not always favoring the 
most-restrictive reading of trademark protection possible,26 
included some opinions notable for restricting the scope of 
trademark protection.  In Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty,27 for instance, the 
Court permitted the use of the Coty trademark on repackaged 
powder and perfume (at least as long as the label truthfully 
indicated the repackaging).  In American Steel Foundries v. 
Robertson,28 the Court refused to extend trademark protection to 
the word “simplex” because “simplex” was part of the name of a 
different company that registered the word on other products.29  
But it was Kellogg that truly set the tone for the pre-Lanham Act era. 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); United Drug 
Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918). 
 24. Hanover Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 415, 419-20; Rectanus, 248 U.S. at 98-100. 
 25. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).  Shortly before Hanover Star Milling and Rectanus the 
Court decided G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co., 237 U.S. 618 (1915), in 
which one publisher sought to prevent another publisher from using “Webster’s 
Dictionary” as a designation for its book. In a passage reminiscent of the Singer 
opinion, the Court stated the following: 
After the expiration of a copyright [in the dictionary], it is well settled 
that the further use of the name by which the publication was known 
and sold under the copyright cannot be acquired by registration as a 
trademark, for the name has become public property, and is not 
subject to such appropriation. 
Id. at 622. 
 26. See, e.g., A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923) (enjoining sale of 
grey market goods purchased from a genuine source in France).  The broad 
potential of the Bourjois case would be limited somewhat in scope over a half-
century later in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988). 
 27. 264 U.S. 359 (1924). 
 28. 269 U.S. 372 (1926). 
 29. Id. at 382-84. 
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Kellogg was very much like Singer, in both form and substance.  
National Biscuit Company (Nabisco) sued Kellogg, claiming 
primarily that Kellogg’s use of “shredded wheat” as the name for its 
cereal, and its production of the product in a pillow shape like 
Nabisco’s own product, constituted unfair competition.30  Rejecting 
Nabisco’s claims, the Court strongly reaffirmed the principles 
enunciated in Singer.  In fact, when discussing the name “shredded 
wheat” (which it found generic), the Court quoted the passage in 
Singer holding the Singer name to be generic and referring to the 
problem of generic name monopolization resulting from a patent 
monopoly on production.31  Discussing Kellogg’s right to produce 
shredded wheat in a pillow shape, the Court quoted the passage 
from Singer relating to expired patents.32  Finally, as in Singer, the 
Court considered Kellogg’s obligation to avoid confusion.  Unlike 
Singer, it found that Kellogg had taken adequate steps to avoid 
confusion.33  Nevertheless, the principles of Singer were all present 
in Kellogg.  Kellogg did add an important rhetorical and doctrinal 
message in the following passage: 
Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill 
of the article known as “Shredded Wheat”; and thus is 
sharing in a market which was created by the skill and 
judgment of [Nabisco’s] predecessor . . . . But that is not 
unfair.  Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected 
by patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed 
by all—and in the free exercise of which the consuming 
public is deeply interested.34 
Although this is not fundamentally different from the 
sentiment expressed in Singer, the reference to “goodwill” is 
important.  It elevates the interests of the consuming public above 
the “sweat of the brow” of the company whose efforts may have 
brought the product to the marketplace, and whose market is now 
being taken, in part, by a competitor who is able to profit from 
another’s initial investment in the product. 
The importance of this last passage is best seen in light of 
 
 30. Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 113. 
 31. Id. at 118. 
 32. Id. at 120 (quoting Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 
(1896)).  See supra text accompanying note 16 for the quoted passage. 
 33. Id. at 120-22 (finding sufficient distinctiveness in the size and shape of the 
biscuit, the prominence of the Kellogg name, and the size, form, and color of the 
packaging). 
 34. Id. at 122. 
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another well-known but non-trademark case, International News 
Service v. Associated Press.35  In that case, the Court upheld an 
injunction against International News Service (INS) for 
“misappropriation” of Associated Press’s (AP’s) news stories, as INS 
allowed its members to publish West Coast newspapers using stories 
taken from the East Coast newspapers of AP members.36  The 
Court’s opinion included the oft-quoted passage that INS should 
not be permitted to “reap where it has not sown,”37 in effect 
denying INS the right to trade on AP’s goodwill.  International News 
Service was decided over a vigorous dissent by Justice Brandeis, the 
author of the Kellogg opinion (some twenty years later).38  Thus, the 
quoted passage in Kellogg presumably serves multiple purposes.  It is 
a not-so-subtle measure of revenge by Justice Brandeis against a 
case with which he disagreed, and it is a forceful reminder that the 
misappropriation doctrine does not mean that copying and sharing 
in the goodwill of a market created by another is necessarily 
unfair—indeed, it may be presumptively fair competition.39  This is 
important, and not just for trademark law.  The misappropriation 
mantra—that one should not “reap where one has not sown”—is a 
powerful one in intellectual property law.  Indeed, in a case like 
Kellogg, a strong urge exists to protect a market created and 
nurtured by one company from the seemingly “predatory” actions 
of a competitor.  That urge also exists in the four “new 
millennium” cases discussed below, all of which involve attempts to 
protect the “goodwill” built up over time by plaintiffs against 
various perceived encroachments by defendants.  Kellogg provides a 
powerful rhetorical and doctrinal counterpoint to the urge to 
protect competitors from perceived acts of misappropriation.40  
Kellogg set standards that endure to this day, even in the post-
 
 35. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).  This case mainly deals with copyrightability of news 
information. 
 36. Id. at 230-31. 
 37. Id. at 239. 
 38. Id. at 248 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 39. The dissenters in Kellogg clearly believed that by sharing in shredded 
wheat’s goodwill, Kellogg was competing unfairly.  Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 123 
(McReynolds & Butler, JJ., dissenting).  Neither Justice Brandeis nor Justice 
McReynolds cited the International News Service case. 
 40. There are, of course, differences between Kellogg and International News 
Service.  In the latter, competition and the public were arguably best served by 
prohibiting the conduct because it threatened AP’s ability to compete at all.  In 
most cases, however, consumers are better served by having competition, which 
can result in a lower price and/or a better product. 
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Lanham Act era.  It was, perhaps, the apex of the Supreme Court’s 
twentieth-century trademark jurisprudence, given the number of 
principles it enunciated and the thoughtful treatment those 
principles received. 
One might be tempted to see the Mishawaka decision41 five 
years later as a partial repudiation of Kellogg’s broad statement that 
competitors can share in the goodwill of a product, even if created 
by the sweat of another.  However, that would be a mistake.  
Mishawaka involved an infringement suit against a manufacturer of 
replacement heels for shoes.42  The plaintiff complained that 
defendant’s replacement heels contained a red plug virtually 
identical to that used by plaintiff in the original heels.43  Justice 
Frankfurter’s opinion for the Court contains a frequently quoted 
passage about the value of trademarks: 
The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by 
making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the 
market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. 
Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same—to 
convey through the mark, in the minds of potential 
customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which 
it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has 
something of value. If another poaches upon the 
commercial magnetism of the symbol he has created, the 
owner can obtain legal redress.44 
This strong statement about trademark law protecting 
“commercial magnetism” must be tempered by two important facts.  
First, the issue of infringement (and, specifically, what might 
constitute infringement) was not before the Court—only the issue 
of the proper remedy was to be decided.  Second, Justice 
Frankfurter wrote only for a four-person majority; only seven 
Justices participated in the case, and they were divided four to 
three.  Thus, Mishawaka’s place in the Court’s trademark 
jurisprudence can be, and probably has been, easily 
overemphasized. 
A final first-half-of-the-century-long foray into trademark law 
was Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders,45 which was consistent with 
 
 41. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203 
(1942). 
 42. Id. at 203-04. 
 43. Plaintiff evidently did not manufacture replacement heels.  Id. 
 44. Id. at 205. 
 45. 331 U.S. 125 (1947). 
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the general tenor of most of the Court’s earlier opinions.  Written 
by Justice Douglas (who dissented in Mishawaka), the opinion 
acknowledges the right of a competitor to use the trademark of 
another when selling reconditioned versions of the other’s goods—
in this case, reconditioned spark plugs—as long as consumers are 
told the truth about the nature of the goods and the source of the 
reconditioning.46  The Court provided some relief for the 
trademark owner, namely, requiring truthful disclosure.47  But the 
defendant had not challenged this relief before the Court, and the 
Court rejected the plaintiff’s entreaty for further protection and 
damages.48  Champion reiterates a general theme running through 
the earlier cases that trademark law is, at its core, aimed at 
deception.  Where there is no deception, both Kellogg and 
Champion decided that trademark law offers no protection. 
Shortly after Champion, the Trademark Act of 1946, commonly 
known as the Lanham Act, became effective.49  The Lanham Act 
was the first trademark statute to actually federalize trademark 
law.50  In many respects, the Lanham Act codified existing common 
law principles, including some enunciated in the major Supreme 
Court opinions discussed above.  In other respects, the statute 
extended the common law, creating a degree of uniformity and 
protection previously unknown to trademark law.  For the first 
time, a national trademark was a reality in law.  The 
implementation of the Lanham Act, which conveniently occurred 
almost halfway into the twentieth century, is an appropriate 
dividing line for a discussion of Supreme Court jurisprudence in 
trademark law. 
C.  The Twentieth Century: Post-Lanham Act 
The enactment of a comprehensive federal trademark statute 
might have been expected to engender a spate of Supreme Court 
cases interpreting the new law.  Paradoxically, quite the opposite 
 
 46. Id. at 130. 
 47. Id. at 131-32. 
 48. Id.  Denying an accounting, the Court distinguished the Mishawaka case.  
Id. at 131. 
 49. The Act, named after its long-time sponsor, Representative Fritz Lanham, 
went into effect on July 5, 1947.  Lanham Trademark Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 
(1946) (codified and amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1128 (2000)). 
 50. Following the In re Trade-Mark Cases, other statutes were enacted, but they 
did not fundamentally alter trademark law, which continued to be governed 
largely by the common law. 
11
Welkowitz: The Supreme Court and Trademark law in the New Millennium
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
WELKOWITZ-FORMATTED 7/20/2004  6:49:44 PM 
1670 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:5 
occurred.  For four decades following the statute’s passage, the 
Supreme Court appeared willing to allow lower courts to shoulder 
the burden of interpreting and, in many cases, expanding the 
scope of protection afforded by the statute.  The Court stepped 
into trademark law only very occasionally, largely to sort out 
relatively minor differences among the courts.  In 1952, for 
example, it held that the Lanham Act could be used to reach 
conduct by United States citizens occurring in another country 
where significant effects were felt in the United States.51  In 1964, 
the Court obliquely referred to trademark in the Sears-Compco 
cases.52  It rejected claims that the lighting fixtures at issue in those 
cases had “secondary meaning” and could be protected 
notwithstanding their expired patents.53  Thus, Sears-Compco simply 
reiterated the pre-Lanham Act idea that trademark law could not 
fill the gaps left by patent law.  In 1967, the Court dealt with a fairly 
minor aspect of monetary remedies under the Lanham Act.54  By 
the time the Court truly returned to trademark law, most of the 
landscape had been carved out by lower courts, in a manner fairly 
protective of trademarks. 
The Court did not return to trademark until the 1980s.  Its 
first real trademark case upon its return was the Ives case in 1982.55  
Ives was primarily a case about contributory trademark 
infringement.  Generic drug manufacturers were accused of 
supplying pills in a color and shape that allegedly facilitated illegal 
substitutions for branded drugs.56  Although it was thought that in 
this case the Supreme Court might finally venture a serious opinion 
about trademark law, the result was rather less-than-satisfying in 
that regard.  The real holding of Ives was that the court of appeals 
 
 51. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286 (1952).  It is perhaps 
noteworthy that in Steele, the Court described the Lanham Act as “complex and 
controversial,” id. at 283 (footnotes omitted), and seemed almost relieved that the 
case did not require it to interpret the substantive provisions of the statute.  
Indeed, in footnotes accompanying this statement, the Court listed a number of 
discussions pertaining to that complexity and controversy.  Id. at nn.6-7. 
 52. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. 
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
 53. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 232; Compco, 376 U.S. at 238. 
 54. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 
(1967) (holding that there is no right to attorney’s fees under the Lanham Act).  
The statute now permits such recoveries in “exceptional cases.” Lanham Act 
§ 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000). 
 55. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). 
 56. Id. at 846-49. 
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had failed to give proper deference to the district court’s findings 
of fact.57  In passing, the Court set forth what it assumed were 
commonly accepted standards for contributory infringement58 and 
functionality,59 without engaging in an extended discussion of 
either.60  Ultimately, Ives provided little insight into the Court’s 
thinking about trademark law.61 
Three years later, the Court took up another case, Park ’N Fly, 
Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc.62  Here, the issue was the proper 
evidentiary status afforded to “incontestable” trademarks.63  The 
Ninth Circuit had ruled that incontestability was only a shield 
against cancellation, and could not be used to foreclose a defense 
that the mark was merely descriptive and had no secondary 
meaning.64  The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, viewing 
the case as calling for a straightforward application of the plain 
language of the statute.65  The statute did not make the distinction 
drawn by the Ninth Circuit; indeed, the statutory defenses to 
incontestability did not include “descriptiveness.”66  Moreover, the 
Court found some support in the legislative history for its 
 
 57. Id. at 855-58. 
 58. Id. at 853-54. 
 59. Id. at 850 n.10. 
 60. Justice White, concurring, expressed concern that the Court had 
acquiesced in a reduced burden on the plaintiff for showing contributory 
infringement, id. at 860-62 (White, J., concurring), though the Court disagreed.  
Id. at 854 n.13.  In any event, Justice White’s opinion, which provides a more 
extensive analysis of contributory infringement, expressed concern lest 
contributory infringement give overbroad protection, especially to branded drugs.  
Id. at 861. 
 61. See, e.g., An Analysis of the Ives Case: A TMR Panel, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 118, 
118-20, 140 (1982).  At one point in the discussion, a panelist stated: “I do not 
believe that this case will stand for any significant proposition of trademark or 
unfair competition law which would not, or ought not, have stood before this 
decision.” Id. at 140. 
 62. 469 U.S. 189 (1985). 
 63. See id. at 191.  See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115 (2000) (listing the 
conditions for granting and the effects of incontestable status).  Essentially, after a 
mark has been registered and in constant use for five years, the registrant may, by 
filing the proper affidavit, gain “incontestable” status, id. § 1065, meaning that the 
registrant is conclusively presumed to have the exclusive right to use the mark on 
the goods and services for which it is registered.  Id.§ 1115. 
 64. Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 192-93.  A merely descriptive mark cannot be 
registered without “secondary meaning,” which means it cannot be registered 
without showing that the relevant public regards it as a source identifier and not 
simply as a description of the goods or services.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e), (f) 
(2000). 
 65. Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 205. 
 66. Id. at 196. 
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conclusion that this omission was not accidental.67  It did not 
question the wisdom of Congress’s choice, leaving that to legislative 
action.68  Only Justice Stevens dissented.69  He thought it improper 
to afford incontestable status to a merely descriptive mark, 
registration of which he assumed resulted from an error by the 
Patent and Trademark Office.70  Moreover, he feared the 
overprotection of “words or phrases that are a part of our common 
vocabulary,” stating that “[l]anguage, even in a commercial 
context, properly belongs to the public unless Congress instructs 
otherwise.”71 
Although Park ’N Fly ultimately took the position most 
favorable to trademark protection, it did not involve a major public 
policy interface with trademark law.  The case foreclosed one door 
to challenging incontestable marks, but many others remained.  
The case did not alter the direction of trademark law in any 
meaningful way.  The Court’s next foray into trademark law, 
however, did involve an interface between trademark law and 
public policy, but the Court was either unaware of its implications 
or chose to ignore them. 
Seven years passed before the Court’s next important 
trademark case.  The Two Pesos case72 posed the question whether 
 
 67. Id. at 196-97. 
 68. See id. at 202 (asserting that the dissent simply disagrees with the balance 
struck by Congress). 
 69. See id. at 206-20. 
 70. Id. at 207, 212 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  That may not be so.  The mark 
could have had weak secondary meaning when registered, but then reverted to 
merely descriptive status later. 
 71. Id. at 215 (citations omitted) (Stevens, J. dissenting).  His citations are 
interesting, one of which is a pre-Lanham Act case from the nineteenth century, 
Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)  311, 323-24 (1872), which reiterated the fear 
of over-protecting descriptive terms as marks.  Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 215 n.21.  
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Park ’N Fly may presage his thinking in the KP Permanent 
case currently before the Court, which raises the issue of the breadth of the 
“descriptive fair use” defense of § 33(b)(4).  See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. 
Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 
981 (2004).  This case is discussed infra Part III.D. 
 72. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).  Five years 
before Two Pesos, the Court did have occasion to comment on a trademark-related 
problem, in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 
U.S. 522 (1987).  In that case, the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a 
special statute (section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. § 380) that gave 
the United States Olympic Committee exclusive rights in the word “Olympic” in 
most commercial contexts.  See id. at 540-41.  Although primarily a first 
amendment case, the Court’s opinion noted, and did not disturb, the broad 
trademark protection granted to the USOC by the statute, which was very similar 
14
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an “inherently distinctive” trade dress could be protected without 
any showing of secondary meaning.73  The case was brought under 
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act because the “mark” at issue, the decor 
of a restaurant, was not registered.74  Unlike the statutory sections 
in Park ’N Fly, § 43(a) is broadly worded, so that its language alone 
could not dictate a result.75  However, in the absence of Supreme 
Court guidance, over the previous forty years the lower courts had 
steadily expanded the reach of § 43(a), creating a large 
background for the Court’s decision.  Rather than reassessing that 
background, the Court simply accepted it as settled law and 
proceeded, almost perfunctorily, to apply the existing paradigm to 
the case before it.  Thus, the Court accepted the hierarchy of marks 
created by the Second Circuit76—arbitrary/fanciful, suggestive, 
descriptive, generic—and applied it mechanically to a restaurant.77  
The problem, of course, is that the hierarchy (based on a 
distinction between “inherently distinctive” and other marks) was 
developed for word marks, and is not necessarily well-suited for 
testing whether the decor of a restaurant should be protectable.78  
The Court never really considered the differences between trade 
dress and word marks, saying only that nothing in § 43(a) (a 
broadly worded statute that does not even use the word 
 
to that provided by trademark dilution statutes.  See id. at 539. 
 73. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 764-65.  A mark that is inherently distinctive is 
deemed capable of acting as a source identifier without any showing that the 
public actually recognizes it as such (i.e., without secondary meaning).  See id. at 
769.  Generally speaking, “merely descriptive” marks (those that simply describe 
the goods or services) are not considered inherently distinctive and therefore 
require a showing of secondary meaning to be protected.  See id.  Generic terms 
cannot be protected as trademarks, even if there is a showing of secondary 
meaning.  Id. at 768 (citations omitted). 
 74. See id. at 765. 
 75. Compare Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (creating 
liability “in connection with any goods or services or any container for goods, uses 
in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof”) with 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115.  See supra text accompanying note 63. 
 76. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773-74 (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. 
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)). 
 77. See id. at 773-76. 
 78. As the Court would later note, some trade dress can be denominated as 
“descriptive,” such as a green can for lime soda.  See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson 
Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995) (stating, in dicta, that orange color of 
marmalade was not source identifier).  The doctrine of functionality can be used 
to smooth out some of the anticompetitive edges in the protection of trade dress.  
See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 774-75.  But these obscure the more fundamental 
problems that a secondary meaning requirement could create for small 
companies.  Id. 
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“trademarks”) indicated that trade dress should be treated 
differently than word marks.79  The Court concluded that the 
restaurant’s decor could be protected as “inherently” distinctive,80 
and awarded substantial monetary damages,81 despite the fact that 
the jury found that the decor was not recognized by consumers as a 
source identifier.82 
It was left to the concurring opinions to confirm what this case 
was about—the affirmation of standards created by lower courts 
over a half-century without the Supreme Court’s intervention.83  
Ultimately, the concurring justices also accepted the existing 
framework and did not seriously question its application in this 
case.  This proved a mistake, as the Court found it necessary to 
revisit this area in 2000—about which there will be additional 
comment below. 
The Court’s last trademark case before 2000, Qualitex,84 was 
truly, to borrow from former President Bill Clinton, a “bridge to 
the twenty-first century.”85  Qualitex asked whether color alone 
could be a trademark.86  Although the Court’s affirmative answer to 
that question seemingly solidified the trend of expanding 
trademark rights, Justice Breyer’s opinion was far more extended 
and nuanced than the Court’s previous opinions in the post-
Lanham Act era.  Thus, although the Court recognized correctly 
that color could be a trademark, it also recognized that “a product’s 
 
 79. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773-74. 
 80. See id. at 776 (affirming the decision of the court of appeals). 
 81. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 
1991) (damage award of $1,868,600 (after doubling), plus attorney’s fees of 
$937,550). 
 82. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 766. 
 83. Justice Stevens argued that the original text of § 43(a) “has been 
transformed by the federal courts,” but agreed that the extension of protection to 
trade dress was “consistent with the purposes of the statute and has recently been 
endorsed by Congress.”  Id. at 776 (Stevens, J., concurring).  He argued that the 
federal courts had expanded the interpretation of false designation of origin in 
§ 43(a) to encompass trademark and trade dress infringement, id. at 779-80, but 
that Congress acceded to this, particularly in its 1988 revision of the Lanham Act.  
Id. at 783.  Justice Thomas felt that § 43(a)’s language directly supported an 
inclusion of trademark infringement, citing the “false description  .  .  .  including 
words or other symbols tending falsely to describe” language of the statute.  Id. at 785 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 84. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
 85. William J. Clinton, Address at the Democratic National Convention (Aug. 
29, 1996), available at http://www.4president.org/speeches/clintongore 
1996convention.htm (last visited July 8, 2004). 
 86. 514 U.S. at 160-61. 
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color is unlike ‘fanciful,’ ‘arbitrary,’ or ‘suggestive’ words or 
designs, which almost automatically tell a customer they refer to a 
brand.”87  It analogized color to a descriptive mark, which can 
require secondary meaning.88  Yet, even this showed that the Court 
was thinking beyond the surface of the hierarchy to its underlying 
function of determining whether a mark is a source identifier.  The 
Court also made reference to aesthetic functionality, a doctrine 
often criticized by the bar, but which the Court believed had value 
in cabining trademark, and preventing it from stepping into the 
realm of patent law.89  In sum, although the Court granted 
protection, it did so in a way that recognized the problems, and 
that reminded courts of their obligations both to assure themselves 
that the proposed mark truly was a mark (limiting color marks to 
those with secondary meaning) and that marks do not interfere 
with competitive values.  The former certainly was a departure from 
Two Pesos, which applied the trademark distinctiveness hierarchy 
without much discussion of its logic in the trade dress context.90 
At the close of the twentieth century, the Court’s trademark 
jurisprudence in the second half of the century largely reflected 
the Court’s absence from the scene.  Lower courts had seized the 
initiative in interpreting the Lanham Act, and the Supreme Court 
intervened only very occasionally and only where there was a circuit 
split, essentially acquiescing to the trends set by the lower courts 
and Congress.  Congress was notably active in the latter part of the 
century, enacting a comprehensive reform of the Lanham Act in 
 
 87. Id. at 162-63 (citations omitted). 
 88. Id. at 163. 
 89. See id. at 164-65 (stating “[i]t is the province of patent law, not trademark 
law, to encourage invention . . .”).  A design feature is “aesthetically functional” if 
it is an ornamental design feature, and competitors deprived of the use of that 
feature would be at a significant disadvantage in the marketplace.  See id. at 170.  
For example, if one company makes yellow computer cases and a competitor 
could not make a yellow computer monitor, that might be a problem of aesthetic 
functionality.  See Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 
F.2d 76, 79-82 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991) (ruling that 
competitor could not be prevented from making Baroque-style silverware). 
 90. The Court also recognized the changes in the common law brought by 
the Lanham Act that permitted color to be registered as a mark.  Qualitex, 514 U.S. 
at 171-73.  Specifically, the Lanham Act’s definition of trademark was intended to 
broaden the universe of registrable marks, and the Court accepted Congress’s 
extension of the law without criticism.  Id. at 171.  Certainly, Qualitex cannot be 
said to have relied on a pre-Lanham Act conception of the law to reach its 
conclusion. 
17
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1988,91 the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in 1995,92 and the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act in 1999.93  Each of 
these statutes represented an extension of trademark law in 
response to issues raised in the lower courts.94  At the turn of the 
century, no Supreme Court cases were in sight to interpret the last 
two statutes.  Only in Qualitex did the Court show any sign of 
understanding that the expansion of trademark law might require 
an approach more sensitive to competing interests, one that could 
even suggest a need to slow this expansive trend. 
II. TRADEMARK LAW IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 
As noted earlier, I am choosing to begin the new millennium 
with the year 2000 even though it is technically the end of the old 
one.  Not only was 2000 the “layperson’s” new beginning, but also 
the Court’s trademark case in 2000—Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara 
Brothers, Inc.95—represents a fairly clear break from the bulk of the 
Court’s late twentieth century trademark jurisprudence.  It also 
marks a clear beginning of a jurisprudence that harkens back to 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and its discomfort 
with the treatment of trademarks as a species of intellectual 
property.96 
A.  Wal-Mart 
The Wal-Mart case was an apt place to begin the new 
 
 91. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 
(1988). 
 92. Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c) 
and 1127 (2000)). 
 93. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1117(d), 1125(d), 1127, 1129 (2000)). 
 94. S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 7-8 (1988), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 
5583-84 (noting that the 1988 amendments were intended to “provide consistent 
national protection for the tremendous value of famous marks” by protecting 
them from dilution); H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030 (explaining that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
creates a federal cause of action for trademark dilution and assists American 
companies that compete with foreign companies); H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 5-6 
(1999) (enacting legislation to combat “cyberpiracy,” which involves individuals 
who attempt to profit by reserving domain names similar to trademarked names 
with no intent to use them). 
 95. 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
 96. The last of the four “new millennium” cases, the Dastar case, contains an 
interesting and poignant contrast between trademark and copyright.  See infra Part 
II.D. 
18
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millennium.  It addresses one of the latest developments in 
trademark law, namely, the use of the design of a product as a 
trademark.97  The Court visited this issue (or at least a closely 
related one) before in Two Pesos, where the Court held that it is 
possible for trade dress (product designs are considered a species 
of trade dress) to be protected if it is “inherently distinctive.”98  
Lower courts assumed that Two Pesos applied equally to all forms of 
trade dress, including product designs, but the results reached were 
unsatisfactory.99  Yet, in Wal-Mart, after a short preliminary 
discussion, the Court made the bold statement that “[n]othing in 
[the trademark statute], however, demands the conclusion that 
every category of mark necessarily includes some marks ‘by which 
the goods of the applicant100 may be distinguished from the goods 
of others’ without secondary meaning—that in every category some 
marks are inherently distinctive.”101  The Court reasoned that 
although some devices such as word marks and packaging are 
almost always intended to serve as source identifiers, other devices 
such as product designs and colors do not automatically signify 
source.102  This is a materially different tone than Two Pesos, where 
the Court emphasized that nothing in the statute indicated that 
trade dress should be treated differently than word marks.  Here, 
the Court in effect states that nothing in the statute requires trade 
dress and word marks to be treated the same. 
Perhaps the most telling portion of the opinion came next, in 
the following statement: 
The fact that product design almost invariably serves 
purposes other than source identification not only 
 
 97. In Wal-Mart, the plaintiff alleged that defendant had copied the design 
motif of plaintiff’s line of children’s clothing.  Underscoring the intellectual 
property orientation of the case, plaintiff brought both copyright and trademark 
infringement claims.  Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 208. 
 98. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text. 
 99. See, e.g., David  S. Welkowitz, Trade Dress and Patent—The Dilemma of 
Confusion, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 289, 309-20 (1999). 
 100. The Court was referring here to the registration applicants under § 2 of 
the Lanham Act on the assumption, drawn from Two Pesos, that the standards of 
section 2 applied equally to the protectability of unregistered marks under 
§ 43(a).  See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 210. 
 101. 529 U.S. at 211 (footnote added).  The Court then cited Qualitex Co. v. 
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162-63 (1995) to demonstrate that one type of 
trademark—color—can only be protected on a showing of secondary meaning.  
Id. 
 102. Id. at 212-13.  It is interesting that the Court made this assertion with no 
citation to factual authority. 
19
Welkowitz: The Supreme Court and Trademark law in the New Millennium
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
WELKOWITZ-FORMATTED 7/20/2004  6:49:44 PM 
1678 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:5 
renders inherent distinctiveness problematic; it also 
renders application of an inherent-distinctiveness 
principle more harmful to other consumer interests.  
Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of 
competition with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic 
purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a rule of 
law that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new 
entrants based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness.103 
This, too, is a startling change in direction for the Court.  
Rather than simply applying the statutory language and the judicial 
gloss of many lower courts, the Court injected the view that the 
interpretation of the statute (at least when it allows for 
interpretation) must include a separate consideration of consumer 
interests, assuming that such interests will be different than 
trademark owner interests.  Moreover, the Court recognized that 
trademark law could be used as a competitive weapon, and that the 
effectiveness of this weapon turned not on the ultimate result of 
the suit, but on the ability of the plaintiff to sustain the suit past an 
early stage.  Thus, the Court rejected a multifactor test that would 
not permit early disposition of lawsuits.104  Indeed, when discussing 
the distinction—now very important—between packaging, which 
can be inherently distinctive, and product design, which requires 
secondary meaning, the Court directed lower courts to err in close 
cases on the side of finding trade dress to be product design, not 
packaging.105  Clearly, the Court wanted these suits to be more 
carefully scrutinized.  Recognizing the anticompetitive nature of 
such suits is an important step because copyrights and patents are 
recognized as sanctioned monopolies, with the societal benefits 
flowing from the inducement to produce works and inventions.  
Obviously, the Court did not believe that a trademark monopoly 
creates the same kind of societal benefit.  As if to make clear that 
trademark law is different from copyright and patent, the Court 
noted that those doctrines would permit protection for many 
product designs, and ameliorate the consequences of its decision.  
In other words, the message to trademark owners is, if you want 
intellectual property protection, use “real” intellectual property 
 
 103. Id. at 213. 
 104. Id. at 213-14 (citing the multifactor test formulated in Seabrook Foods, 
Inc. v. Bar-well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1977)). 
 105. Id. at 215.  The Court relegated its Two Pesos decision to its facts, 
characterizing it as either a packaging case (a rather dubious conclusion) or some 
tertium quid that is akin to packaging.  Id. 
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doctrines, not trademark law.106 
In a rather short opinion, the Court made a clean break from 
its previous post-Lanham Act cases.  Gone was the deference to 
lower courts;107 gone was the acceptance of the judicial expansion 
of trademark law.  In their place was a message that trademark 
protection had to compete with other concepts that also form the 
basis of trademark law, such as consumer protection, and that 
trademark law was not a substitute for conventional intellectual 
property protection. 
B.  TrafFix 
In the Court’s next term, it decided TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. 
Marketing Displays, Inc.108  TrafFix was really a follow-up to Wal-Mart.  
The case similarly involved trademark protection for a product 
design.109  But the issue was whether the dual-spring design for a 
temporary road sign was functional, and thus ineligible for 
trademark protection.110  The issue was complicated, or perhaps 
simplified, by the fact that Marketing Displays (MDI), the plaintiff 
and purported trademark owner, had expired patents on the 
design.111  The case required the Court to decide the effect of an 
expired patent on the test for functionality. 
Before turning to the particulars of the case, the Court began 
with some general principles, notably the following: 
Trade dress protection must subsist with the recognition 
that in many instances there is no prohibition against 
copying goods and products.  In general, unless an 
 
 106. See id. at 214.  It is also interesting that the Court specifically noted that 
the doctrine of functionality includes aesthetic functionality.  Id.  The Court had 
no obvious reason to include this statement, but the inclusion emphasizes the 
Court’s determination that trademark law does not become an alternative to 
patent and copyright.  Id. 
 107. The Court rejected a test promulgated by a lower court.  Id. at 213-14 
(citing Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 
1977)). 
 108. 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
 109. Id. at 25. 
 110. Id. at 27-28.  See also 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e)(5), (f) (2000) (functional 
designs not registrable); 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(8) (2000) (functionality as a defense 
to trademark incontestability); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2000) (in action for trade 
dress infringement, burden of proof is on trademark owner to show non-
functionality); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc, 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000) 
(trade dress must not be functional); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 
159, 164-65, 169-70 (1995) (discussing functionality). 
 111. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 25-26. 
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intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright 
protects an item, it will be subject to copying.  As the 
Court has explained, copying is not always discouraged or 
disfavored by the laws which preserve our competitive 
economy.112 
The same line between trademark and patent/copyright is 
drawn in TrafFix, as in Wal-Mart.  The Wal-Mart philosophy that 
trademark is different than conventional intellectual property and 
that trademark law should not hinder competition was furthered.  
Indeed, the Court’s statement implied that trademark law is 
intended to “preserve our competitive economy,” not to grant 
proprietary rights to trademark owners.113 
When assessing functionality, the Court did not draw as 
definitive of a line as it did in Wal-Mart; however, it did take a fairly 
strong stand against trademark protection in this context.  The 
Court held that a utility patent is “strong evidence” of functionality, 
and that it created a significant barrier to any contrary 
conclusion.114  Equally important, the Court explained its prior 
statements about the test for functionality.  In Qualitex, the Court 
had stated that a feature was functional “if it is essential to the use 
or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the 
article, that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors 
at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.”115  Several lower 
courts, including the one in TrafFix, interpreted the last phrase as 
permitting trademark protection for a patented product design 
unless the feature was “a competitive necessity.”116  The Court 
disagreed, however, stating that the latter analysis was only 
necessary where the issue was aesthetic functionality.117  If the 
feature is important to the way the product works, it is not 
necessary to investigate whether other means exist to accomplish 
the same end.118  As a result, the Court made it harder for a plaintiff 
to avoid a finding of functionality by demonstrating the existence 
of alternative designs available for defendant’s use.119  Finally, at the 
 
 112. Id. at 29 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 113. See id. 
 114. Id. at 29-30.  The Court’s discussion assumed that the feature to which 
trademark protection was to attach was part of the claims of the patent.  Id. at 31. 
 115. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 
456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)) (emphasis added). 
 116. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32-33. 
 117. Id. at 33.  Aesthetic functionality is explained supra note 89. 
 118. Id. at 34. 
 119. The Federal Circuit, however, seems not to have taken the hint as 
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end of the opinion (and not in a footnote), the Court sidestepped 
a broader constitutional challenge to trade dress protection, but 
noted “[i]f, despite the rule that functional features may not be the 
subject of trade dress protection, a case arises in which trade dress 
becomes the equivalent of an expired utility patent, that will be 
time enough to consider [the effect of the Patent and Copyright 
clause].”120  This issue may have more relevance if trademark 
dilution, the subject of the Court’s next trademark opinion, regains 
its momentum as a form of trademark protection. 
C.  Moseley 
The combination of Wal-Mart and TrafFix sent a significant 
message to the trademark world.  However, in terms of immediate 
practical effect on the results of cases, and the momentum in this 
area of law, the case of Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.121 may be the 
most significant new millennium trademark case. 
The case was the Court’s first foray into the realm of 
trademark dilution, a form of trademark protection for 
“distinctive” marks122 that protects such marks from the erosion of 
their “unique” identities.  Unlike traditional infringement claims, 
dilution does not require any showing of likelihood of confusion.  
Thus, dilution protection provides a potentially very powerful form 
of protection, a virtual form of property in a trademark.  Although 
many states had laws providing dilution protection dating from the 
1950s and 1960s,123 this form of trademark protection became 
immensely popular following the passage of the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act (FTDA) in 1995.124  Thus, like Wal-Mart and TrafFix, 
 
seriously as it might have.  See Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 
1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that TrafFix did not preclude consideration of 
alternative designs, and that TrafFix did not alter the law of functionality).  Cf. 
Antioch Co. v. W. Trimming Co., 347 F.3d 150, 156 (6th Cir. 2003) (declining to 
decide whether TrafFix permits consideration of evidence of alternative designs). 
 120. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 35.  Defendant had asserted that trade dress 
protection for product designs created the equivalent of a perpetual patent, in 
violation of the “limited times” provision of the Patent and Copyright Clause. 
 121. 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
 122. In the federal version, only “famous” marks are protected.  See Lanham 
Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000). 
 123. The earliest such law dates from 1947 in Massachusetts.  See Moseley, 537 
U.S. at 430. 
 124. Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1125(c) and 1127 (2000)).  For a comprehensive treatment of trademark 
dilution law, see generally DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, 
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Moseley presented the Court with an issue of the extent of 
trademark protection in a new and different form from that found 
in traditional cases. 
The facts of Moseley, particularly the involvement of the 
lingerie giant Victoria’s Secret, attracted much attention.  In 
Elizabethtown, Kentucky, near an Army base, Victor and Cathy 
Moseley opened a store called “Victor’s Secret” (later renamed 
“Victor’s Little Secret”), which advertised various items, including 
lingerie, “Lycra Dresses,” “Romantic Lighting,” and “Adult 
Novelties/Gifts.”125  The store came to the attention of Victoria’s 
Secret via a letter from an Army colonel, who saw the advertisement 
in his base newspaper.126  Victoria’s Secret sued, claiming both 
traditional infringement (i.e., likelihood of confusion) and 
trademark dilution under the federal statute.127  The district court 
found no likelihood of confusion and dismissed the infringement 
claim, but found in favor of Victoria’s Secret on the dilution 
claim.128  The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling on 
the dilution claim.129 
On the surface, the issue before the Court was relatively 
narrow.  The FTDA permits a remedy when a second user “causes 
dilution” of the first user’s famous trademark.130  The question was 
whether this language required a plaintiff to prove that there was 
actual harm to the mark from dilution in order to prevail, or 
whether it was sufficient to demonstrate that there was a 
“likelihood of dilution.”  On this question, the circuits had split.131 
Moseley is not an example of judicial craftsmanship.  The 
opinion jumps from place to place and its result is far more 
muddled than one would like.132  Nevertheless, the opinion 
 
STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (BNA Books 2002 & Supp. 2003). 
 125. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 423. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Kentucky has no dilution statute. 
 128. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 425. 
 129. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d, 
537 U.S. 418 (2003).  The infringement ruling was not appealed.  Id. at 467. 
 130. Lanham Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000). 
 131. Compare Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah 
Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 460-61, 464-65 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 923 (1999) (holding actual dilution necessary) with Nabisco, Inc. v. PF 
Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding likelihood of dilution 
sufficient) and  Moseley, 259 F.3d at 475-76. 
 132. Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, seemingly repudiating 
the opinion he purports to join, is another oddity in the Court’s handling of the 
case and emphasizes the lack of clarity in the opinion.  See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 435 
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contains many echoes of Wal-Mart and TrafFix. 
The Court began its substantive discussions with a relatively 
bland statement: “Traditional trademark infringement law is a part 
of the broader law of unfair competition.”133  Then, the Court cited 
Qualitex for the proposition that trademark law protects consumers 
from deception and producers from unfair competition.134  These 
statements are nevertheless consistent with the line separating 
trademarks from patents and copyrights that was evident in TrafFix 
and Wal-Mart.  But this introduction is followed by more pointed 
statements.  First, when discussing the development of trademark 
dilution, the Court noted (almost gratuitously): “Unlike traditional 
infringement law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution are 
not the product of common-law development, and are not motivated 
by an interest in protecting consumers.”135  The message is clear that this 
form of trademark protection is to be viewed with care, even 
skepticism, because it is not like ordinary trademark law.  Ordinary 
trademark law is grounded in unfair competition and consumer 
protection, not intellectual property. 
The next section of the opinion discusses the legislative history 
of the FTDA, although the purpose of this discussion is not clear 
because the Court did not follow Congress’s apparent intent.136  
However, evidence of the Court’s skepticism about dilution can be 
inferred.  The Court makes a point of stating how quick and 
perfunctory Congress’s consideration of the bill was in 1995, 
emphasizing the “[one]-day hearing” held by the House 
committee, the lack of any opposition at that hearing, and the fact 
that the Senate passed the House version the day it was introduced 
“by voice vote without any hearings.”137  Since the content of the 
House committee report and the Senate floor statements quoted in 
this section went virtually ignored in the rest of the opinion, the 
emphasis on the process of passage is striking.  The best 
explanation is that the haste with which Congress appeared to be 
 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 133. Id. at 428. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 429 (emphasis added). 
 136. Justice Scalia declined to join this section of the opinion, which is entirely 
devoted to a legislative history discussion.  At the end of this section, the Court 
quotes a portion of the House Report to the effect that dilution includes both 
blurring and tarnishment.  Id. at 431.  Yet, in the next section, where the Court 
states that tarnishment may not be encompassed by the FTDA, this legislative 
history is nowhere to be found.  Id. at 432. 
 137. Id. at 431. 
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acting gave credence to the Court’s skepticism about the propriety 
of expanding federal trademark law into this area. 
Arguably, one could characterize the Court’s ultimate holding 
as coming to a middle ground between the “presumption of harm-
likelihood of dilution” standard of the Sixth Circuit below and the 
“actual economic harm” standard derived from the Fourth 
Circuit.138  However, the “actual dilution” standard, which the Court 
not unreasonably derived from the language of the statute,139 makes 
it extremely difficult to prove a dilution case, particularly when 
combined with two other aspects of the Court’s opinion.  First, 
although the Court disclaimed any requirement of actual economic 
harm, it was extremely vague about what evidence would suffice to 
show actual dilution.  All it would say is that a plaintiff could 
dispense with a survey140 “if actual dilution can reliably be proved 
through circumstantial evidence—the obvious case is one where 
the junior and senior marks are identical.”141  The meaning of this 
statement has mystified courts.142  Second, the Court’s view of 
dilution itself also makes winning a case difficult.  In the Court’s 
view, it is not enough that the junior use “call to mind” the senior 
use for dilution to be found.  The junior use must also change 
consumer perceptions about the senior mark.143  As the Court 
stated: “ ‘Blurring’ is not a necessary consequence of mental 
association.”144  While a survey might show a mental association 
between the marks, it will be difficult to show the kind of altered 
perception of the famous mark required by the Court. 
 
 138. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of 
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 460-61, 464-65 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923 
(1999).  The Fourth Circuit waffled on the exact standard.  Some language in the 
opinion certainly supports the actual economic harm requirement, but other 
language supports a standard similar to the one that was ultimately adopted by the 
Supreme Court.  The “presumption” language in the Moseley opinion refers to the 
fact that in some circuits the court could presume harm from indirect evidence 
that dilution was likely to occur.  As the Court noted, the Second Circuit had set 
forth a number of factors to use in determining likelihood of dilution, and this 
standard had been followed by the Sixth Circuit in Moseley.  See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 
426 n.6, 427 n.8. 
 139. The Court cited the “causes dilution” language of § 43(c)(1), contrasting 
it with the explicit “likelihood of dilution” standard found in the earlier state 
statutes such as the one in Massachusetts.  Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432-33. 
 140. In practice, such a survey could be expensive and difficult to accomplish 
properly. 
 141. Id. at 434. 
 142. See Ty Inc. v. Softbelly’s, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 535 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 143. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433-34 (explaining the “blurring” concept). 
 144. Id. at 434. 
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Moseley relied more on the precise statutory language than did 
Wal-Mart or TrafFix, largely because the statutory language in those 
cases did not answer the question posed.  But Moseley’s direction 
certainly was consonant with the other cases.  The Court again 
emphasized the consumer protection and unfair competition roots 
of trademark law and took a narrow view of trademark protection, 
the scope of which is more akin to a property right than to 
consumer protection.  The effect of the Moseley decision on the 
courts was a dramatic slowdown in dilution opinions, as compared 
with the pre-Moseley period.145 
D.  Dastar 
The last of the Court’s new millennium cases is, in truth, not 
really a trademark case.  Nevertheless, it is included here because 
the claim central to the Court’s opinion arises under the Lanham 
Act,146 and the tenor and philosophy of the Court’s opinion is 
entirely consistent with the three cases discussed above. 
In Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox,147 Dastar bought copies of a 
videotaped television series that was (at least arguably) in the 
public domain.  The original series, owned by Fox, was based on a 
book by Dwight Eisenhower.  Dastar edited the tapes, made some 
minor alterations, and sold its own tapes under a new name, with 
no reference to Fox or General Eisenhower’s book.148  Fox sued, 
claiming copyright infringement, and also “reverse passing off,” the 
latter under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.149  As in Moseley, the precise 
language of the statute proved important.  Relevant to Dastar, 
 
 145. See infra text at notes 182-86.  The Court also questioned whether one 
common category of dilution—trademark tarnishment—was even protected by the 
federal law.  Tarnishment refers to the association of a mark with unsavory 
characteristics, such as pornography, drug use, or poor quality goods.  See Coca-
Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (involving an 
“Enjoy Cocaine” poster in script and colors resembling Coca-Cola packaging).  In 
a statement in Moseley, the Court expressed doubt that the definition of dilution 
contained in the federal statute (and now contained in a majority of state dilution 
statutes) encompassed tarnishment.  Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432. 
 146. To be precise, Lanham Act § 43(a), codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) 
(2000).  This is the same section that was at issue in Wal-Mart and TrafFix, albeit a 
different use of that section. 
 147. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003). 
 148. Id. at 2044. 
 149. The reverse passing off claim asserted that Dastar’s failure to give 
attribution to Fox in effect “passed off” Fox’s product as that of Dastar (the reverse 
of the usual passing off claim, in which Dastar would try to pass off Dastar’s 
product as that of Fox’s). 
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§ 43(a) permitted a claim for making a “false designation of origin” 
of the “goods.”150  The key legal question was whether “origin” of 
“goods” means only the source of the product itself, or whether it 
includes the source of the work embodied in the goods. 
Initially, the Court responded to Fox’s claim by stating that the 
phrase “origin of goods” means just that—the source of the 
physical product, not the ideas that it may embody.151  In other 
words, although Fox may have been the source of the underlying 
ideas and/or content,152 the actual tape was made by, and therefore 
originated, with Dastar.  The Court then considered Fox’s 
argument that those products whose selling point is really the 
creative or “communicative” aspect, not the physical product, 
should be treated differently.153  It is here that the Court’s 
discussion took an interesting turn. 
“The problem with this argument,” wrote the Court, “is that it 
causes the Lanham Act to conflict with the law of copyright, which 
addresses that subject specifically.”154  The Court went on to quote 
the Sears-Campo case about the right of the public to make the 
goods once a patent expires (citing also the Kellogg case), the 
TrafFix opinion about the right of the public to copy items 
unprotected by “an intellectual property right,” and the Bonito Boats 
case, concerning the reciprocal rights conferred on and extracted 
from copyright and patent owners.155  It then quoted the passage in 
TrafFix about being “ ‘careful to caution against misuse or over-
extension’ of trademark and related protections into areas 
traditionally occupied by patent or copyright.”156  The Court 
returned to the Trade-Mark Cases to note that “[f]ederal trademark 
law ‘has no necessary relation to invention or discovery,’ ”157 
 
 150. Id. at 2047. 
 151. Id.  The Court noted that a Coke drinker would be concerned that the 
actual drink came from Coca-Cola, not that Coca-Cola be the source of the formula 
from which it is made.  Id. 
 152. In fact, Fox was apparently responsible for neither, though it had once 
owned a copyright in the original tapes.  See id. at 2044 (stating that the series was 
produced by Time, Inc., with the copyright assigned to Fox, but the copyright not 
renewed in 1977). 
 153. Id. at 2048. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. (citing TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 
(2001); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 
(1989); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964); Kellogg Co. 
v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121-22 (1938)). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. (quoting In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)). 
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 5 [2004], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss5/6
WELKOWITZ-FORMATTED 7/20/2004  6:49:44 PM 
2004] TRADEMARK LAW IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 1687 
cementing the separation of trademark from intellectual property. 
Later in the Dastar opinion, the Court creates a bond with Wal-
Mart and TrafFix by stating that a contrary result would be 
inconsistent with the results of those cases, which also resisted uses 
of trademark law that prevent copying of public domain 
materials.158  Summing up, the Court again asserted that the 
Lanham Act’s foundations “were not designed to protect originality 
or creativity.”159  In what must be termed a rather ironic use of a 
recent case, it concluded: “To hold otherwise would be akin to 
finding that [section] 43(a) created a species of perpetual patent 
and Copyright, which Congress may not do.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 
537 U.S. 186, 208  . . .  (2003).”160  The citation of Eldred is 
interesting because in Eldred, just months earlier, the Court 
resoundingly (though not unanimously) upheld Congress’s power 
to extend the term of existing copyrights against arguments that 
this effectively created a perpetual copyright.161  Citing Eldred for 
the limiting proposition in Dastar demonstrates just how far 
removed the Court wants trademark law to be from traditional 
intellectual property. 
III. THE LESSONS OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM 
What can be learned from the Supreme Court’s cases thus far 
in the millennium?  First, as discussed below, it appears that Wal-
Mart was the beginning of a paradigm shift in trademark law.  
Second, some of the lower courts have not fully implemented this 
new paradigm, perhaps in part because they do not recognize it, 
perhaps in part out of habit, or perhaps in part because they are 
accustomed to developing trademark law on their own, with the 
Supreme Court operating largely in the background.  Third, the 
new paradigm could lead to a reexamination of recent extensions 
of trademark law that tend to treat trademark less like unfair 
competition and more like property. 
A.   The Paradigm Shift 
Beginning with Wal-Mart, the Court increasingly has viewed 
trademark law through the lens of unfair competition, rather than 
 
 158. Id. at 2049. 
 159. Id. at 2050. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208, 222 (2003). 
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intellectual property.  In Wal-Mart, the fear of unwarranted 
monopolization of product designs was evident in the Court’s 
discussion of the need for a clear rule to discourage lawsuits that 
would hinder competition.162  The TrafFix statements about 
functionality reinforce the viewpoint of unfair competition versus 
intellectual property.163  The observation in Moseley that trademark 
dilution protection benefits trademark owners, not consumers, 
follows the same path.  Finally, Dastar’s specific juxtaposition of 
trademark on the one hand and intellectual property rights (i.e., 
copyright and patent) on the other, together with its reiteration of 
the TrafFix caution about overprotecting trademarks, solidifies the 
theme.  As a result, whether certain uses of trademark law will be 
permitted seems to turn on whether there is some pro-consumer, 
or at least pro-competitive (or anti-unfair competition) aspect to 
the particular trademark principle in question.  In other words, the 
Court tests trademark not with an eye toward protecting trademark 
owners for their own sake, but protecting consumers and the 
competitive economy from harm. 
To some degree, the consistency of the message may reflect 
the stability of the Court’s membership.  No new justices have been 
appointed since the time before the Qualitex opinion in 1995,164 
and that stability has allowed the Court to speak with a unanimous 
voice on the subject. 
On the other hand, rather than being a completely new 
vantage point, the new paradigm may be an example of “what goes 
around, comes around.”  By regarding trademark as a species of 
unfair competition, rather than intellectual property, the Court 
returned to its pre-Lanham Act view of trademark law.  In the 
Trade-Mark Cases, the Court specifically rejected an attempt to 
ground trademark in Congress’s power over other forms of 
intellectual property.165  In Singer and Kellogg, the Court emphasized 
the needs of competition when ruling that marks were generic.166  
The Court also emphasized that once a patent expires, trademark 
law cannot be counted on to retain the patent monopoly.  The 
 
 162. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2003). 
 163. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (dealing 
with patent law). 
 164. Justice White, who wrote the Two Pesos opinion, retired in 1993, and was 
succeeded by Justice Ginsburg.  The last Justice to retire was Justice Blackmun, in 
1994, succeeded by Justice Breyer. 
 165. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879). 
 166. See supra notes 18, 31 and accompanying text. 
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same pro-competitive theme was echoed in Champion Spark Plug, 
permitting used spark plugs imprinted with the original brand 
name to compete with new ones of the same brand.167  In Hanover 
Star Milling and Rectanus the requirement that the trademark 
follows the trade underscores the unfair competition aspect of 
trademark over property rights—good-faith junior users cannot be 
“unfairly” deprived of their right to retain their trade, even in the 
face of a senior user from another region. 
The primary message seems to be that the post-Lanham Act 
expansion of trademark law into something akin to traditional 
intellectual property law deeply concerns the Court.  Admittedly, 
the justices may have different reasons for their concerns.  Justice 
Breyer has demonstrated a broad concern about the expansion of 
intellectual property rights.168  To a lesser degree, Justice Stevens 
has indicated his concerns as well.169  Several of the Justices may be 
concerned that Congress is beginning to reach the boundaries of 
its enumerated powers.  Although the Commerce Clause gives 
Congress broad power to regulate, the existence of a specific power 
to regulate intellectual property, a power that allows rights only for 
“limited times” and that impliedly contains other limitations,170 may 
be viewed as an implicit limit on Congress’s power to expand the 
scope of trademark rights, especially where those rights would rival 
the limited intellectual property rights provided in the Patent and 
Copyright Clause.171 
Emphasizing unfair competition over intellectual property may 
help explain how the same Court that decided Moseley and Dastar 
could so forcefully uphold Congress’s authority in Eldred v. 
 
 167. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. 
 168. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242-69 (2003) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in 
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970). 
 169. Three of his opinions in intellectual property cases provide useful 
examples: Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (Justice Stevens 
wrote the opinion for the Court); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222-42 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 206-20 (1985) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 170. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 
(1991) (stating “[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement” of copyright). 
 171. Justice Thomas has indicated his discomfort even with the current 
interpretation of Congress’s commerce power, apparently preferring the more 
limited interpretation of the late nineteenth century, when the Trade-Mark Cases 
were decided.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 n.8 (1995) (Thomas, 
J., concurring). 
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Ashcroft.172  Although Eldred clearly expanded the scope of 
Congress’s copyright authority, that authority was exercised 
pursuant to a specific grant of intellectual property power. 
Moreover, the Court was able to cite rather old precedent that was 
at least analogous to the term extension problems at issue in 
Eldred.173 
B.  Some Implications of the New Trademark Paradigm 
Certain implications of these cases seem obvious.  Where 
trademark law comes into conflict with patent or copyright, or 
begins to look like a substitute for patent or copyright, expect the 
Court to be wary.  One area where this may arise is 
pharmaceuticals, where drug companies have used trade dress law 
(the color and/or shape of pills, for example) in an attempt to 
extend their exclusive rights to sell certain products.174  Another 
obvious problem is trademark dilution protection for product 
designs.175  Such protection, if permitted,176 would bring trademark 
law very close to the realm of design patent.177  Perhaps 
functionality will prove an obstacle.  The Court’s continued 
mention of the aesthetic functionality may be a warning to lower 
courts to ensure that the issue does become an obstacle, but if not, 
one would expect the Court to step in and preclude such 
expansion. 
In an indirect way, these cases could have some effect in areas 
seemingly far afield from trademark law—for example, the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)178 and the proposed database 
protection law.179  Portions of the DMCA are not really regulations 
 
 172. 537 U.S. 186, 201-04 (2003). 
 173. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 201-04. 
 174. See generally Shire US Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(finding shape and color of an unpatented drug functional). 
 175. See I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 48-51 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(questioning dilution claim concerning design of faucet); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 171, 
173 (2000) (stating that a design that meets the statutory patentability standards 
can receive patent protection for fourteen years). 
 176. See TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 95-98 
(2d Cir. 2001) (marks must be inherently distinctive to be eligible for federal 
dilution protection). 
 177. See I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 51-53 (Boudin, J., concurring); see also TrafFix 
Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 35 (2001). 
 178. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of Title 17 of the United States Code). 
 179. See Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. 
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of copyright.180  Of course, the Court could find these provisions to 
be “necessary and proper” adjuncts to the powers under the 
Copyright Clause.  Eldred’s deferential treatment could be 
supportive here.  But one also should recall Dastar’s pointed 
comment about perpetual copyrights, and its citation to Eldred.  
The database protection law would rely on the commerce power as 
well.  Moreover, the Court may be troubled by the use of the 
commerce power to circumvent Feist’s constitutionally based 
preclusion of copyrighting facts.181  Indeed, the Court could choose 
to view the issue as one of unfair competition.  Depending on the 
Court’s view of the value of the law as a protection for consumers, 
the Court may give less deference to Congress’s power than it did 
in Eldred. 
What can we learn from the recent cases about the Court’s 
attitude toward logical extensions of trademark, some of which are 
already occurring?  Digital media, the Internet, and globalization 
have been at the forefront of technology and intellectual property 
since the last few years of the twentieth century.  In 1999, Congress 
added the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA)182 
to the Lanham Act, as § 43(d), just after the dilution section, 
§ 43(c).  The ACPA seeks to protect trademark owners from others 
who, in bad faith, register domain names containing trademarks 
(or terms confusingly similar to trademarks).  Much of the ACPA’s 
focus is on domain names that are identical to or “confusingly 
similar” to another’s trademark and that are registered in bad faith 
(often to sell the domain name at a premium to the trademark 
owner).  Therefore, the four new millennium cases might not seem 
to raise problems for this extension of trademark law.183  But there 
are various aspects of the ACPA that raise interesting issues.  First, 
 
(1999); Collections of Information Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1998); Database 
Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996, H.R. 3531, 104th 
Cong. (1996). 
 180. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 813 (6th ed. 2003) (“Chapter 12 [the 
DMCA] is not copyright legislation—strictly, or even not so strictly, speaking.  
Rather, it is what has been termed ‘paracopyright’ legislation: a new and 
independent set of regulations on activities related to the use of copyrighted 
works, in addition to those of copyright law itself.”). 
 181. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1991). 
 182. Pub. L. No. 106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-545 
(1999) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 125(d) (2000)). 
 183. The domain name registrants usually are not using the mark as their 
trademark.  Often they are using it to capitalize on Internet search engines to 
direct possibly unknowing Internet users to their sites. 
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in addition to allowing a remedy against domain names that are 
confusingly similar to a trademark, the ACPA allows suits where the 
offending domain name is merely “dilutive” of another’s (famous) 
trademark.184  Thus, it incorporates the concerns the Court 
expressed about dilution favoring trademark owners, not 
consumers, despite the “consumer protection” label on the statute.  
Moseley and its penumbra may affect any ACPA claims alleging 
dilution.  Second, “noncommercial use or fair use” is a factor in 
assessing bad faith, but not a defense, which represents a change 
from the law in other situations.185  One would expect the Court to 
keep a wary eye on this statute for possible anticompetitive uses.186 
The ACPA contains another innovation—albeit one that 
reaches back to the nineteenth century—in that it permits an in rem 
action against the domain name, where the true owner of the 
offending domain name cannot be found or is not subject to in 
personam jurisdiction.187  This provision will test the Court’s 
willingness to review personal jurisdiction in an international 
context.  The last such case resulted in a ruling against jurisdiction 
over the foreign entity, although that was an in personam action.188  
The in rem provisions of the ACPA also would require the Court to 
revisit Shaffer v. Heitner189 in a new context. 
The Internet also has spearheaded an extension of traditional 
likelihood-of-confusion analysis to encompass something called 
“initial interest confusion.”190  The basis for this claim is that 
 
 184. Lanham Act § 43(d)(1)(A)(ii)(II), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(II) 
(2000). 
 185. See Lanham Act § 33(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000) (fair use 
defense); Lanham Act § 43(c)(4)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (2000) 
(excluding noncommercial uses from causes of action for dilution). 
 186. Section 43(d)(1)(B)(ii) gives a defense to bad faith if the person 
reasonably believed the use was fair or lawful.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) 
(2000).  Depending on how this provision is interpreted, it may ameliorate the 
effect of making noncommercial uses only a factor.  The KP Permanent case, 
discussed infra Part III.D, which deals with the fair use defense under § 33(b)(4), 
may shed some indirect light on this issue. 
 187. Lanham Act § 43(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2) (2000). 
 188. Asahi Metal Ind. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) 
(holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction by California court over 
Japanese manufacturer would be unreasonable and unfair). 
 189. 433 U.S. 186, 216-17 (1977) (holding that Delaware’s assertion of in rem 
jurisdiction over defendants violated the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution).  The last case to raise an issue pertaining to a “traditional” form of 
personal jurisdiction, Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), 
resulted in unanimous agreement on the result, but no majority rationale. 
 190. See, e.g., Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 
34
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 5 [2004], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss5/6
WELKOWITZ-FORMATTED 7/20/2004  6:49:44 PM 
2004] TRADEMARK LAW IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 1693 
consumers191 are initially drawn to the defendant’s web site by the 
use of, for example, a domain name containing another’s 
trademark, or a search engine that lists a particular site as a result 
of the use of metatags in the web page code or just the use of the 
trademark somewhere on the web page.192  It is often characterized 
as protection against a “bait and switch,” where consumers are 
misled into purchasing from someone other than the trademark 
owner by mistake.193  However, if the consumer is only momentarily 
misled, as when he or she goes to the wrong Internet web site, and 
can recover in one or two mouse clicks when the error becomes 
apparent, the consumer protective function of this doctrine 
becomes rather thin.  Instead, it looks more like protection for the 
trademark owner against a competitor that has sold goods or 
services to a consumer who is fully aware at the time of purchase 
from whom he or she is purchasing. 
A recent appellate case extended this pliable doctrine even 
further.  Netscape Communications uses its search engine as a 
vehicle to sell banner advertisements on the Internet.194  One of its 
ventures involves selling “keyed” advertisements, which are 
triggered by search terms entered by a user.195  Netscape keyed 
advertisements relating to “sex and adult oriented entertainment” 
to the words “playboy” and “playmate,” leading to a lawsuit by 
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. (PEI).196  PEI’s main theory was that users 
would think that they were clicking on an ad for a Playboy site, and 
would realize their mistake only when they arrived at the website.  
PEI described this as a means to “gain[] a customer by 
appropriating the goodwill that [PEI] has developed in its [] 
mark.”197  The district court granted summary judgment to 
 
F.3d 1036, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 191. Initial interest confusion is not limited to actions involving consumer 
issues, but claims of initial interest confusion by consumers are the most common. 
 192. See Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 
1025 (9th Cir. 2004).  The concept works also in the “brick and mortar” world if 
someone is initially induced to inquire of defendant based on the similarity 
between defendant’s name and that of plaintiff.  Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus 
Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 193. See AM Gen. Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 828 (7th Cir. 
2002). 
 194. Banner ads stretch along the top or side of a web page.  Playboy, 354 F.3d 
at 1023. 
 195. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1023. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 1025.  See Promatek Indus. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812-13 
(7th Cir. 2002) (“What is important is not the duration of the confusion, it is the 
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Netscape, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding 
issues of fact to be tried.198 
Initial interest confusion poses a challenge in light of the 
Court’s new millennium posture.  In many ways, this form of 
trademark infringement gives property-like value to the “goodwill” 
of the mark, and only incidentally protects consumers from harm.  
Moreover, it may be another form of a litigation “weapon” that a 
trademark owner can use to forestall entry by a competitor.  The 
Court could possibly label a defendant’s actions a form of “unfair” 
competition, justifying the doctrine on that basis.  However, should 
such a case reach the Court, the Court will have to reconcile its 
consumer oriented, pro-competition view of trademark with a 
doctrine seeking to protect trademark owner goodwill (which is 
also the province of trademark dilution, the issue in Moseley).199  
The concurring opinion in Playboy v. Netscape pointed out the 
broad and problematic potential of the initial interest confusion 
doctrine.200  The last has certainly not been heard of this.  One 
would expect an eventual trip to the Supreme Court, though it 
probably will require a serious split in the circuits before the Court 
takes up this issue. 
Finally, the Internet may test the outer limits of Congress’s 
power to regulate trademark related problems occurring, at least in 
part, outside the borders of the United States.  This, too, will pose 
interesting challenges for the Court.  In addition to the personal 
jurisdiction problems referred to earlier, there are international 
comity issues to consider.  Just what is the limit of the United States 
regulatory authority in the international marketplace?  The Fourth 
Circuit recently took an expansive view of Congress’s power to 
reach uses that only affect marks used overseas.201  The Supreme 
 
misappropriation of Promatek’s goodwill”).  PEI also alleged trademark dilution.  
Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1031-34. 
 198. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1034. 
 199. The statement in Kellogg that a competitor may share in the market 
originator’s goodwill may not apply here because the competitor arguably is 
seeking to share in the goodwill of the trademark, not just the product.  However, 
Kellogg was decided at a time when the power of trademarks was only beginning to 
be realized.  It may be that a strong trademark is a barrier to entry necessitating 
some use of the mark to compete.  Cf. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 
1968) (finding no infringement in the use of competitor’s mark in truthful 
comparative advertisement). 
 200. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1034-36 (Berzon, J., concurring). 
 201. Int’l Bancorp L.L.C. v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des 
Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1052 
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Court denied certiorari in the case; no split in the circuits exists.  
But the issue will probably resurface.  Previous cases offer few clues 
to the Court’s thinking on this matter.  None of the federalism 
issues that have dominated the commerce power debates of late 
exists in this context.  Thus, the Court may be more inclined to 
defer to Congress, especially if it believes that United States 
consumers will be confused.202 
These issues involving the new millennium technology of the 
Internet, the concerns of globalism, and the expansion of 
trademark laws to reach those issues represent some of the tests of 
the Court’s recent jaundiced view of trademark-as-property.203  If 
the Court remains on the course set thus far in the new 
millennium, then we may see a United States trademark regime 
that distances itself from international trends. 
C.  The Effect on Lower Court Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court decides a tiny number of cases each 
year—fewer than 100 are given full hearings.204  Thus, the Court 
must depend on district courts and the courts of appeals to 
implement its vision. 
It is somewhat early to assess the effects of such recent cases, 
but a few preliminary judgments can be made.  The Moseley and 
Dastar cases appear to have had an impact—Moseley’s being very 
significant.  Part of the reason for Moseley’s impact may be its lack of 
guidance.205  Nevertheless, the decision has slowed the pace of 
dilution cases significantly and made winning such cases a very 
difficult proposition.206  No appellate court has upheld a finding of 
 
(2004).  The Casino de Monte Carlo challenged the registration of various domain 
names by a non-United States national that included the casino’s trademark.  
However, the casino’s only activity in the United States is promotional—it operates 
no business here, although United States citizens visit the casino in Monte Carlo to 
gamble.  The Fourth Circuit held that the United States advertising, plus the use 
of the casino in Monte Carlo by United States citizens, invoked the foreign 
commerce power of Congress and fell within the “use in commerce” requirement 
of the Lanham Act.  Id. at 363-70. 
 202. But cf. Asahi Metal Ind. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 115-16 
(1987) (expressing concern about U.S. courts adjudicating claims with little 
connection to this country). 
 203. In this regard, the Court’s view seems contrary to the international trend. 
 204. The Justices’ Caseload, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ 
about/justicecaseload.pdf (last visited July 8, 2004). 
 205. See Ty Inc. v. Softbelly’s, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 535-36 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 206. In the few successful cases, district courts have found the marks to be 
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dilution since Moseley.207  The Ninth Circuit has remanded three 
dilution cases with instructions to reconsider in light of Moseley, but 
without any guidance as to the proper framework for the inquiry.208  
Courts appear to have been following Dastar, resulting in some 
dismissals.  Potentially, Dastar could fundamentally change the 
framework of false designation of origin claims under § 43(a), but 
it is too early to tell.209 
Of the two earlier cases, Wal-Mart is easier to implement.  Its 
requirements are straightforward, and its admonishment about 
close cases (presuming it is a design, not packaging) simplifies the 
decision-making process.210  TrafFix was less clear; as a result, not all 
 
identical.  Nike, Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1372 (S.D. 
Ga. 2003); Pinehurst, Inc. v. Wick, 256 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431 (M.D.N.C. 2003); 
Scott Fetzer Co. v. Gehring, 288 F. Supp. 2d 696, 702 (E.D. Pa. 2003); see Four 
Seasons Hotels & Resorts B.V. v. Consorcio Barr S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1331-
32 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (actual harm found in case where marks were identical).  Cf. 
Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, No. 02 Civ. 9377 SAS, 2003 WL 22451731 at *13-15, 68 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1893 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2003) (even where marks are identical, further 
evidence of actual dilution may be required); Lee Middleton Original Dolls, Inc. v. 
Seymour Mann, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 892, 902 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (in apparent 
identical mark case, court decides to send issue of dilution to jury “[i]n view of the 
developing status of the law on the nature of evidence required”); see also Softbelly’s, 
353 F.3d at 535-36 (noting, but not deciding, the issue of required evidence in a 
non-identical marks case).  One oddity is that lower courts have not taken up and 
expressly ruled on Moseley’s strong hint that tarnishment may not be covered by 
the FTDA. 
 207. See Softbelly’s, 353 F.3d at 535-36; Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 
F.3d 616, 625-28 (6th Cir. 2003); Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car, 
Inc., 330 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 208. Horphag Research, Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2003), 
cert. denied sub nom., Garcia v. Horphag Research Ltd.,124 S. Ct. 1090 (2004); 
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1033 & 
n.56 (9th Cir. 2004); Visa Int’l Serv. Assn. v. JSL Corp., No. 02-17353, 03-15420, 
2003 WL 23018942 at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2003). 
 209. See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 23-25 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(enjoining rebroadcast of Monty Python edited episodes that “mutilated” the 
originals).  The use of § 43(a) made in Gilliam could be undermined by Dastar.  As 
the concurring judge in the case noted, the “false designation” claim could be 
handled by an appropriate disclaimer.  Id. at 27 (Gurfein, J., concurring); but see 
id. at 25 n.13 (majority rejects disclaimer as inadequate).  The Gilliam case, like 
Dastar, included a copyright claim.  The demise of false attribution claims under 
§ 43(a) also could call into question whether the United States is adhering to its 
obligations under the Berne Convention, governing copyrights.  Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis(1) (July 24, 
1971), 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (Paris Revision) [hereinafter Berne Convention], available 
at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/index.html (last visited July 8, 
2004). 
 210. See, e.g., Adidas-Salomon AG v. Target Corp., No. CV-01-1582-ST, 2002 WL 
31971831 at *10-11 (D. Or. July 31, 2002) (following Wal-Mart, choosing to view 
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courts have been eager to accept it as establishing a new 
functionality framework, though some movement is apparent.211 
D.  Speculation about the KP Permanent Case 
As of this writing, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in 
another trademark case, KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting 
Impression I, Inc.212  KP Permanent differs from the previous “new 
millennium” Supreme Court cases in that it does not involve an 
expansive use of trademark law in a new form, such as a product 
design, dilution, or a right of attribution.213  Instead, it is a rather 
ordinary dispute not unlike the Park ’N Fly case.214  Lasting 
Impression has an incontestable trademark in a logo containing 
the words “MICRO COLORS,” used on permanent make-up.215  KP 
Permanent made a competing product and used the term 
“microcolor” on advertising circulars and on the labels of its 
pigment bottles.216  When Lasting Impression demanded cessation 
of KP Permanent’s use of “microcolor,” KP Permanent sought a 
declaratory judgment of non-infringement.217  Among its claims was 
that it had a “fair use” defense to any infringement under section 
33(b)(4), asserting that its use of “microcolor” was fair, not as a 
trademark, but instead as a description of its product.218  The 
 
the case as one about product design). 
 211. Compare Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (concluding that TrafFix did not preclude consideration of alternative 
designs nor alter the law of functionality) with Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. 
Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 355-56 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying TrafFix).  See also Eco 
Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 2d 854, 866 n.5 (S.D. Ind. 2003) 
(noting different cases applying TrafFix), aff’d, 357 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(affirming on grounds of no abuse of discretion, but declining to specifically 
uphold the district court’s reasoning).  Cf. Antioch Co. v. W. Trimming Co., 347 
F.3d 150, 156 (6th Cir. 2003) (declining to decide whether TrafFix permits 
consideration of evidence of alternative designs). 
 212. 328 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004). 
 213. See id. 
 214. See supra Part I.C. 
 215. KP Permanent, 328 F.3d at 1065.  Permanent make-up is injected into the 
skin and can be used both for cosmetic purposes and for medical ones (such as 
covering scarring).  Id. 
 216. The process of permanent make-up is also known as micropigmentation.  
Id. 
 217. Id. at 1065-66. 
 218. Fair use doctrine is one of the listed defenses to an incontestable 
trademark.  The relevant portion of the statute reads as follows: 
Such conclusive evidence [of the right to use the registered mark on 
the part of the owner of an incontestable mark] shall be subject to 
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district court upheld this defense and granted summary 
judgment,219 but the Ninth Circuit reversed.220  The Ninth Circuit 
held that KP Permanent must show an absence of confusion to 
invoke the fair use defense.221  The circuits have split on whether 
demonstrating an absence of confusion is a requirement for 
invoking the defense,222 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in an apparent effort to resolve the split.223 
Although this case does not involve a new extension of 
trademark protection, the themes of the four recent cases may 
provide clues to the Court’s disposition of this case.  We can begin 
with the interesting and obvious observation that in the new 
millennium the Supreme Court has reversed the Court of Appeals 
each time.  Perhaps the Court is trying to be a corrective overseer, 
intervening only when it sees a problem.  One assumes that 
eventually this string of appellate losses will be broken; certainly the 
Court takes some cases to affirm them.224  A more analytical clue 
can be garnered by considering the two cases from the Court’s 
most recent term, Moseley and Dastar.  In both cases, the Court gave 
 
proof of infringement as defined in section 1114 of this title [Lanham 
Act § 32], and shall be subject to the following defenses or defects: 
. . . 
(4) That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an 
infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party’s 
individual name in his own business, or of the individual name of 
anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device which is 
descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the 
goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin; . . .  
Lanham Act § 33(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2000). 
 219. 328 F.3d at 1066. 
 220. Id. at 1073. 
 221. Id. at 1072. 
 222. Compare Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 
125 F.3d 28, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1997) (confusion does not eliminate defense); 
Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 110 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(seemingly rejecting confusion as means of eliminating fair use defense), with KP 
Permanent, 328 F.2d at 1072 (fair use defense requires absence of confusion). 
 223. There were other issues brought to the Ninth Circuit, but the fair use 
issue was the only one for which KP Permanent sought review.  KP Permanent 
Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression Inc., 328 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2003), petition for 
cert. filed, No. 03-409, 2003 WL 22429005 at *i (U.S. Aug. 18, 2003).  There is one 
aspect of KP Permanent that is somewhat unusual.  KP Permanent’s use of 
“microcolors,” while arguably not a trademark use, seems designed to make the 
term microcolor into a generic description of the product.  That is different than a 
purely descriptive use of terms that, outside of the trademark context, can be used 
descriptively. 
 224. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), is one such example. 
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a strict interpretation of the applicable statutory language.225  If the 
Court follows this pattern, then a reversal is a distinct possibility. 
The relevant statutory provision, Lanham Act § 33(b)(4), contains 
no mention of “likelihood of confusion” as a factor in the 
defense.226  In addition, the interpretation that gives the least 
protection to the trademark owner (a feature of all four previous 
cases) would favor a defense that does not depend on the absence 
of confusion. 
Viewing KP Permanent from the larger perspective of the four 
cases, we would consider which side is best served by viewing 
trademark via the unfair competition rationale.  This, too, probably 
favors reversal.  The purpose of the fair use defense is to allow 
competitors to fairly use descriptive terms in an effort to compete 
in the marketplace.  Upholding the defense promotes competitive 
advertising of products.  There is some offset here because 
confusion would work to the detriment of consumers.  However, 
the Court may take the approach of Eldred and Park ’N Fly and defer 
to Congress’s judgment about the proper balance between 
promoting competition and combating confusion. 
Finally, the “old millennium” case of Park ’N Fly provides some 
tantalizing hints about the thinking of two justices.  Justice Stevens 
dissented in Park ’N Fly, asserting that descriptive marks should not 
be considered impervious to later attack.227  He also warned that 
descriptive marks should not receive overly broad protection.228  His 
belief would favor reversal in KP Permanent, since the fair use 
defense is predicated on a competitor’s descriptive, non-trademark 
use of the other’s mark.  Justice Kennedy was the author of the 
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Park ’N Fly, which took the position that 
one could defend against an infringement suit by the owner of an 
 
 225. In Wal-Mart and TrafFix the relevant statutory provision—§ 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act—did not directly address the questions before the Court. 
 226. Moreover, the logic of the defense belies a requirement that defendant 
show an absence of confusion.  As stated in the body of Lanham Act § 33(b), even 
the owner of an incontestable mark is required to demonstrate infringement—
which means a likelihood of confusion—in order to vindicate its exclusive right to 
use the mark on the items for which it is registered.  In the absence of confusion 
there is no infringement (assuming no dilution claim).  Thus, if there is no 
confusion, no defense would be necessary, and § 33(b)(4) would appear to be 
redundant. 
 227. Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 206-08 (1985) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 228. Id. at 215 (“Language, even in a commercial context, properly belongs to 
the public unless Congress instructs otherwise.”). 
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incontestable mark by showing that the mark was descriptive and 
lacked secondary meaning.229  If that position reflects his current 
belief that descriptive marks (or marks that can be used 
descriptively) do not deserve broad protection, then he, too, may 
favor reversal. 
KP Permanent could provide interesting insights into the 
direction of trademark law in the new millennium.  If the Court 
reads the statute strictly and reverses the Ninth Circuit, it will 
strengthen the trend indicated in the four previous cases, 
particularly Moseley and Dastar.  The new opinion may provide 
important clues about whether the unfair competition view of 
trademark law evident in the four previous opinions continues to 
reflect the Court’s view of the law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the first few years of the new millennium the Supreme 
Court has shown renewed interest in trademark law, deciding as 
many trademark cases in four years as in the previous twenty years.  
A remarkably unified Court has taken what may be termed a 
“traditionalist” approach to trademark, emphasizing its roots in 
unfair competition and attempting to prevent it from filling in 
perceived gaps in the protection afforded by patents and 
copyrights.  In doing so, the Court has narrowly construed the role 
of trademark and strictly construed applicable statutory provisions. 
The Court also may be indicating a general unease with what it 
views as a judicial intrusion into the balance between incentive and 
public access inherent in our patent and copyright laws.  Three of 
the four new cases were based on § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, whose 
expansion was largely the result of judicial action (with later 
congressional acquiescence).  In the fourth case, Moseley, the Court 
went out of its way to hint that its expansion of trademark law 
beyond its usual boundaries was not the product of a careful 
legislative process that considered its effect on other intellectual 
property regimes.  More expansively, the Court may be signaling 
that there are limits to Congress’s power to regulate these areas 
under the Commerce Clause, as opposed to the Patent and 
Copyright Clause. 
Left unstated to this point is whether the Court’s effort to 
 
 229. Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 718 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 
1983), rev’d, 469 U.S. 189 (1985). 
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move trademark law back into the rubric of unfair competition and 
consumer protection is a positive or negative development.  That’s 
a fair, but difficult, question to answer.  It may be best to answer it 
in stages.  At the first stage, it is submitted that the results of the 
four “new millennium” cases are correct.  The first two were an 
overdue signal to the lower courts that trademark protection for 
product designs was beginning to become a serious barrier to entry 
into some product markets.  Dastar was a signal, albeit perhaps a 
crude one, that trademark was encroaching on copyright.  For half 
a century the Court (largely through inattention) allowed lower 
courts to use trademark law, particularly § 43(a), as a back door 
means of circumventing the larger balances in patent and 
copyright law, without much thought being given to the resulting 
distortion of that balance.230  Only two of the Court’s late twentieth 
century cases addressed this expansion, and Two Pesos in particular 
simply acquiesced in the expansion, without truly considering the 
overall impact on intellectual property.  In short, trademark law 
needed a bit of reigning in.231 
The return to an unfair competition and consumer protection 
conception of trademark is not necessarily a bad thing, either.  
Although the expansion of trademark law normally has paid 
homage, at least in form, to protecting consumers from deceptive 
practices,232 the expansion of confusion far beyond point of sale 
confusion made such claims of deception ring a bit hollow.233  That, 
 
 230. Three of the four cases—Wal-Mart, TrafFix, and Dastar—are § 43(a) cases, 
representing the expansion of trademark into product design and right of 
attribution, potential subjects of patent and copyright law. 
 231. Recall that in Moseley, the Court noted pointedly that Congress apparently 
had given little real thought to the expansion of trademark by the addition of 
dilution protection. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 431 (2003) 
(recounting the legislative history of the federal dilution statute).  See supra, text at 
notes 136-37. 
 232. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995); 
Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 640 n.10 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Kohler is free to 
copy Moen’s design so long as it insures that the public is not thereby deceived or 
confused into believing that its copy is a Moen faucet”). 
 233. In the product design area, the standards for confusion virtually 
guaranteed that a competitor’s copy would result in a finding of confusion.  See 
Welkowitz, Trade Dress and Patent, supra note 99, at 323-29.  Despite its 
protestations to the contrary, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Dastar, which 
emphasized the defendant’s “bodily appropriation” of plaintiff’s material, Dastar 
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 34 Fed. Appx. 312, 314 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(using “bodily appropriation” standard, but claiming it “subsumed” confusion 
standard), rev’d, 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003), similarly strays from real notions of 
deception.  And the dilution statute expressly disavows a need for confusion. 
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however, is only stage one.  A more difficult question, stage two, is 
whether the Court’s reconception properly adjusts the balance 
between trademark and other forms of intellectual property.  Here, 
it is worth noting that the “twin aims”234 of preventing consumer 
deception and preventing unfair competition are not necessarily 
congruent.  One might believe that it is “unfair,” for example, to 
compete by free riding on a market for a product created by 
another (the product design problem) even in the absence of 
confusion.235  Indeed, as noted above, the KP Permanent case may 
require the Court to balance the possibility of allowing some 
confusion in an individual case against the larger goal of 
permitting fair but free use of a mark as a descriptive device to 
further competition.  One also might argue that Dastar, by 
eliminating, or at least severely restricting, misattribution claims, 
did not do justice to consumer concerns.  However, on the facts of 
Dastar, it appears that the Court had well-founded fears that the 
plaintiffs were less interested in proper attribution than in being 
able to exact payment for defendant’s use of arguably public 
domain material.236 
There is also the general concern that unfair competition is 
itself a highly pliable doctrine, and thus will not be an appropriate 
vehicle to alleviate the problems addressed by the Court’s recent 
opinions.  This concern is not entirely unfounded.  Early twentieth 
century cases noted (sometimes with approval) this very elasticity.237  
 
 234. With apologies for the terminology to followers of civil procedure.  See 
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
 235. Or, to take a more overt dilution example, one might believe it is “unfair” 
to use another’s famous mark as an attention-getting device, regardless of 
consumer confusion. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 
1994) (upholding dilution claim under New York law against a competitor’s 
advertisement using a humorous alteration of the Deere logo). 
 236. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041, 
2049 (2003) (noting that if Dastar had given attribution it might still have been 
sued).  Cf. Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120-22 (1938) (Kellogg 
had an obligation, which it satisfied, to use the term “shredded wheat” in a 
manner that did not suggest a connection with Nabisco); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964) (though barred from making copying 
actionable as unfair competition, states may require labeling of goods to avoid 
consumer deception). See also Brief Amici Curiae of Intellectual Property Law 
Professors in Support of Petitioner [in Dastar], republished in 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 
931, 944-46 (2003).  The brief suggests that a subsequent publisher of a revised 
version of a work could be required to disclaim association with the original 
publisher, as long as that would not result in a claim against defendants for false 
association.  Id. at 941-43. 
 237. See, e.g., Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 
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The Court’s opinion in Dastar expresses analogous concerns.238  
The results of recent cases, however, signal a possible answer: 
emphasizing the promotion of competition, on the assumption that 
this enhances consumer welfare.239 Although that assumption may 
not be universally correct, it, together with labeling requirements 
that do not constitute “rent” for the use of the trademark, and 
which therefore do not constitute barriers to entry into the market, 
may lead to reasonable accommodations between the goals of 
unfair competition and those of enhancing consumer protection.  
If the latter goal remains paramount, then over time an 
appropriate balance may be struck. 
One expects that this approach will soon face challenges from 
a variety of sources.  Digital media, the Internet, and the global 
economy are the most immediate challengers on the horizon.  
Some of these challenges will raise old issues of personal 
jurisdiction and regulatory authority that will force the Court to 
reexamine older precedent.  Others will confront the Court with 
the growing international trend toward treating trademarks as 
property, in contrast to the visions espoused by the Court in its 
recent jurisprudence.  Whether the Court retains that current 
vision of trademarks being something other than property, and the 
territorial limits traditionally placed on trademark law, will define 
trademark law, and perhaps intellectual property law, for many 
years to come. 
 
1925) (Hand, J.) (“there is no part of the law which is more plastic than unfair 
competition, and what was not reckoned an actionable wrong 25 years ago may 
have become such today”), rev’d, 273 U.S. 132 (1927).  Most of the major Supreme 
Court trademark opinions of that era were actually unfair competition claims, 
decided as a matter of federal common law.  See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit 
Co., 305 U.S. 111, 113 n.1 (1938); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 
403, 411 (1916) (case “decided according to common-law principles of general 
application”).  But cf. A. Bourjois & Co, Inc. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923) 
(upholding injunction against gray market imports under the Trademark Act of 
1905). 
 238. Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2045 (§ 43(a) is not an unlimited unfair competition 
statute). 
 239. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213-14 
(2000) (lawsuits as competitive barriers). 
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